Technical Methodology · v2.0

Allocation Engine Methodology

17 September 2026  ·  CORIOLIS ONE  ·  Version 2.0
This document is a transparency commitment, not a sales document. The allocation engine is only useful if people affected by its recommendations understand exactly how it works. Every design decision documented here is challengeable: that is the point. If something looks wrong, tell us. This is the summary; every formula the engine actually runs, including six items shipped since v1.2 (shadow prices, a sensitivity sweep, real coupling constraints, a game-theoretic cross-check, an efficiency-equity frontier, and per-input provenance), is reproduced in full on request — see Investor Deck.

Why this document exists

A black box that produces numbers nobody can trace back to assumptions is worse than useless in resource management. It generates mistrust, not coordination. Every number this engine produces must be traceable to first principles, and every assumption must be explicit and challengeable.

This document explains every step: what inputs the engine takes, how it weights them, what constraints it applies, and why. If your view of how a particular weight should be set differs from the default, the live engine at /fisheries lets you change any parameter in real time and see exactly what changes.

The problem the engine solves

Most contested resource allocation processes fail for the same reason: each party enters negotiation claiming they need more than the system can sustainably provide, with no neutral mechanism to adjudicate between claims.

The typical result is one of three outcomes: a negotiated overshoot where parties agree to exceed the sustainable limit because no one will accept a cut; a deadlock where negotiations collapse and an often-unsustainable status quo continues; or power capture where the strongest party gets the most regardless of what sustainability or equity would suggest.

CORIOLIS ONE produces a fourth option: a recommendation that is mathematically consistent with the sustainability ceiling, distributes remaining capacity across parties according to documented principles, and explains every allocation in terms any party can trace and challenge.

The inputs

Every allocation is computed from a claim, a treaty floor, and four objective factors per stakeholder, plus a zone-wide sustainability ceiling. Nothing else enters the calculation unless explicitly added by the user running the engine.

1. Claim (Ci)

What the party says they need: their requested quota, historical catch level, or treaty entitlement. The claim is treated as an upper bound on what the party can receive, not a floor and not an automatic entitlement. A platform-wide dominance cap (40% of the ceiling, regardless of weight) can tighten this further, so no single party is ever recommended the entire ceiling on weight alone.

Data source

RFMO quota submissions, national quota requests, treaty schedules, or historical catch records from FAO FishStat or national fisheries agencies. Anonymised proxies (Party A requests X tonnes) are acceptable for pilot runs.

2. Compliance Score (Ki)

A 0 to 1 score reflecting how consistently the party has adhered to past agreed allocations. Compliance is one of four factors combined into a single objective weight per stakeholder, which the constrained solver then maximises against, weighted by a user-adjustable compliance_weight. It is a continuous factor, not a threshold: a poor record downweights a party's priority in the solve, it never excludes them outright, which avoids the perverse incentive a hard exclusion creates (dispute the data rather than improve).

Data source

RFMO compliance committee reports, VMS catch monitoring records, national fisheries reporting. For pilots without compliance data, a neutral score of 0.7 is applied uniformly: neither rewarding nor penalising any party on this dimension.

3. Economic Dependency (Di)

A 0 to 1 score reflecting how reliant the party's economy is on this resource, combined into the same objective weight above via a user-adjustable dependency_weight. A separate mechanism, min_viable_tonnes, can additionally guarantee a party a floor distinct from its treaty minimum — the level below which its position "isn't economically real" — where that figure has been researched for a given stakeholder.

Data source

World Bank national accounts, FAO Fisheries Economic Data, national statistics bureaus. For sub-national actors, revenue as a proportion of total sector GDP.

4. Equity (via GDP per capita)

A log-scaled term favouring lower-GDP-per-capita economies, combined into the objective weight via a user-adjustable equity_weight. Together with historical share (a party's documented past extraction share), these are the four factors the solver actually optimises: compliance, dependency, historical share, and equity — not the "claim × compliance multiplier × dependency floor" model this page described before September 2026 alpha updates, which no longer matched the live engine.

5. Sustainability Ceiling (S)

The scientifically assessed maximum yield consistent with stock recovery or maintenance. This is a hard constraint: the total recommended allocation across all parties will never exceed S. A recommendation that exceeds the ceiling is no better than the status quo.

Data source

Existing stock assessments from ICES (North Atlantic/Arctic), SPRFMO (South Pacific), WCPFC Scientific Committee (Western/Central Pacific), CCAMLR (Antarctic), or national fisheries science institutes. The engine accepts any credible externally-provided assessment. It does not produce its own stock assessments: if the ceiling is wrong, the recommendation is wrong.

The optimisation

With every stakeholder's objective weight computed from the four factors above, the engine solves a genuine constrained linear program (OR-Tools GLOP): maximise the weighted sum of allocations, subject to every party's claim/floor/dominance-cap bounds and the zone's shared sustainability ceiling. The response also carries the LP's own shadow prices and reduced costs, a ±15% sensitivity sweep across all four weights, a cross-check against three real academic claims-problem division rules, and an efficiency-versus-equity trade-off frontier — all computed on every contested-zone request, not a special mode.

Full detail on request

Every formula above, reproduced in full with no summarisation, is available on request alongside the investor deck. Request access →

Design decisions and their rationale

Every design choice in the engine reflects a specific judgement about why previous allocation mechanisms fail. The key decisions:

What the engine cannot do

This section matters as much as the sections above.

Pilot scope

Appropriate for pilots

Proof-of-concept exploration of what a neutral allocation would look like in a given zone. Comparison against existing allocation cycles. Academic modelling and research. Stakeholder engagement exercises.

Not appropriate without further validation

Binding quota decisions without real stock assessment data. Zones where species interaction effects dominate. Situations where legal frameworks would override any algorithmic recommendation.

Transparency and auditability

Algorithm weights are configurable in the live engine at /fisheries. Every parameter is visible. The source code for the allocation engine is available on request to research partners and pilot participants.

The engine's outputs can be reproduced independently by anyone who requests the exact formulas, available alongside the source code above, using the inputs described in this document. Nothing is permanently hidden: the value is in the framework and the interface, not in obscuring the maths from serious partners.

References

FAO (2024). The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture (SOFIA 2024). Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations. 37% of assessed stocks fished at biologically unsustainable levels, up from 10% in 1974.
Fernandes-Salvador, J.A. et al. (2026). Towards Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence for Marine Research, Fisheries and Environmental Management. Fish and Fisheries, 27, 248 to 263. Explainability and governance requirements for AI in fisheries.
ICES (2024). ICES Advice on Fishing Opportunities. International Council for the Exploration of the Sea. Stock assessment methodology and North Atlantic data.
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press. Foundational commons governance theory: the compliance incentive structure draws directly from Ostrom's design principles for long-enduring commons institutions.
Sumaila, U.R. et al. (2021). Financing a sustainable ocean economy. Nature Communications, 12, 3259. Economic dependency framing and fisheries economic data.
WCPFC Scientific Committee (2024). Stock assessment for bigeye tuna in the western and central Pacific Ocean. Zone-specific stock ceiling data used in the Northwest Pacific scenario.
United Nations (2023). Agreement under UNCLOS on Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ Agreement). Legal framework establishing space for technical/scientific support bodies in high-seas resource management.

This document describes the methodology of a working alpha engine and will be updated as the engine develops. Discrepancies between this document and live engine behaviour should be reported via the contact form.  ·  © 2026 CORIOLIS ONE. Not legal or regulatory advice. Pilot outputs are advisory only.

Coriolis One The Hive preview is open: every zone on one globe. Enter the Hive